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THE CONSENT SEARCH WARNING ARGUMENT
Abstract
In 1966, the Supreme Court delivered the landmark Miranda v. Arizona decision that created the
Miranda warning, which reminds citizens of their rights to remain silent and have an attorney
present during custodial interrogations. However, through Schneckloth v. Bustamonte in 1973,
the Court decided not to create a mandatory warning that reminds citizens of their right to refuse
a consent search. Through these cases and the others discussed, the Court has often argued over
whether or not these types of warnings impair police work, whether the contexts surrounding
these instances amount to coercion, and whether or not a warning is constitutionally necessary.
This paper explores the practicality and voluntariness premises but does not discuss whether or
not a consent search warning should be considered constitutionally mandatory. After reviewing
the research, consent searches inherently involve some amount of compulsion but are not
impractical, as some have claimed. Since research shows that a warning would not influence a
significant change in the amount of consent searches or make these situations any more
voluntary, any argument for or against a warning should not be based solely on those grounds.
Instead, this paper introduces a new aspect: procedural justice. A warning could have an impact
in the areas of procedural justice and police legitimacy. Accordingly, police agencies and other
police regulatory entities should adopt consent search warning rules in order to increase their
own legitimacy and citizens’ perceptions of procedural justice.
Keywords: consent search, procedural justice, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, Miranda
warning
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The Consent Search Warning Argument:
Procedural Justice and What a Warning Might Do for Police Legitimacy
Issues of police relations with the public have recently become a pressing concern. Highly
publicized cases of police shootings have dominated the mainstream media, and one could hardly
watch the news in the past two years without mention of the Black Lives Matter movement.
While these headlines have mainly focused on police use of force, these issues have brought to
light tensions among police and the communities they serve, particularly with minorities.
Weitzer (2002) shows that incidents of police misconduct can have lasting negative effects on
public confidence in the police, particularly among African-Americans. Often times, government
agencies try to mend these controversies by changing police leadership, promoting the hiring of
more minority police officers, or implementing more independent police review boards. This
thesis discusses another possibility that could help alleviate tension between police and the
public: consent search warnings.
Tensions between police and minority citizens are not limited to issues of use of force. While
the news headlines in recent months have focused on highly publicized cases of police shootings
of unarmed minorities, efforts to relieve tensions in the wake of these controversies should not
overlook other areas of concern besides use of force. One such area is the consent search.
In 2011, of the U.S. residents age sixteen or older, 62.9 million had at least one contact with
the police in the prior twelve months, and half of those most recent cases were police-initiated
(Langton & Durose, 2013). The percent of these residents with police contact was higher in this
year than in 1999, 2002, 2005, and 2008 – the previous years that the study was conducted
(Langton & Durose, 2013; Eith & Durose, 2011). The percentage of individuals that have come
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in contact with police has risen, and police can legally seek consent to search the person, their
car, their house, etc. in all of these cases.1 Finding an exact, reputable number of consent
searches conducted annually is difficult, (if not impossible), but scholarly estimates have often
found that the number is quite large. Some significant findings estimate that consent searches
amount to the majority of all types of searches conducted annually. While some jurisdictions
require a certain standard, like reasonable suspicion, to seek consent, others have adopted
policies for police to ask for consent in all traffic stops (Nadler, 2003). Many people might
dismiss the threatening nature of this possibility in the belief that they do not have anything
illegal to hide from police, but consent searches are instances where police are seeking a waiver
of constitutional rights that protect citizens from unreasonable government intrusion into private
aspects of life.
In a quarter of the street stops that were included in the 2011 data, people believed the police
behaved improperly, but less than 5% of any type of stop resulted in a formal complaint.
Additionally, when drivers were searched, they were significantly less likely to believe the police
behaved properly regardless of their race, sex, or age (Langton & Durose, 2013). These findings
are alarming in that, although, many people might find their stop to be handled improperly, only
a small portion of people stopped will actually file a complaint so that their unpleasant encounter
is more likely to be formally addressed. Although instances of police involved shootings are
more attractive to the mainstream media headlines, the prevalence of police-initiated contact,
perceived mishandling of those instances, and the unlikeliness that citizens will file a formal
complaint reveal a more likely threat to police-public relations.

1

Based on the federal standard. Some jurisdictions require standards like reasonable suspicion for police to
request consent to search, as will be discussed later.
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In 1946, the Supreme Court decided that consent searches were a valid waiver of Fourth
Amendment rights (Zap v. U.S., 1946.; Davis v. U.S., 1946). Thus, police can seek a citizen’s
permission to conduct a search even when there is no probable cause or search warrant.2 In 1966,
the Supreme Court made a landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona that introduced the Miranda
warning, an informed warning addressing Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments rights. Since
this decision, police have been required to give this warning during custodial interrogations.
When Schneckloth v. Bustamonte made its way to the Court in 1973, the Supreme Court decided
not to create such a rule for consent searches to afford comparable protections of Fourth
Amendment rights. The Supreme Court has reviewed different cases related to the
implementation of warnings and has often based their opinions on their practicality (whether
they impair police work), how voluntary the situation is, and if warnings are constitutionally
required. While this thesis will mention the last premise, its focus is not to discuss if warnings
should be interpreted as constitutionally required. The focus, instead, is examining truth behind
some of the other claims. After applying empirical evidence, consent searches are not impractical
as some have argued. Additionally, there are some inherent coercive aspects that factor into
search consent. Despite this, data shows that warnings are not effective in eliminating this
coerciveness. Because of this, an argument for requiring consent search warnings should not be
based on these claims. This thesis differs from other papers on the subject by dismissing these

2

The Fourth Amendment requires probable cause for police to obtain a search warrant in order to conduct a
search. There are, however, legal exceptions to obtaining a warrant. For instance, exigent circumstances (like
destruction of evidence) or other types of searches (like a search incident to arrest) would be legal exceptions if
probable cause still exists. Searches based off of consent are also legal exceptions to obtaining a warrant.
Additionally, police are allowed to conduct a limited pat-down of a person to search for weapons if there is
reasonable suspicion (a lower threshold than probable cause) that they might be armed and have committed, are
committing, or will commit a crime (i.e. a “Terry-stop,” “Terry-search,” or “stop-and-frisk”). Laws surrounding
stops are separate. For example, for a traffic stop, police would still need a legal reason for stopping someone (i.e.
probable cause, reasonable suspicion) and could legally conduct a search if any of the above standards were met.
Police are allowed to talk to people on the street and ask them questions, but people are not required to answer
the questions (Kanovitz, 2012).
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arguments and introducing a new one. By applying the principles of procedural justice, a consent
warning could have a positive effect in the areas of public opinion and legitimacy in the police.
Supreme Court Case Law
Prior to exploring specific research findings on the subject, a brief recap of Supreme Court
case law on consent searches and police warnings will reveal the main arguments surrounding
the topics. There is a plethora of Supreme Court cases that are relevant to this topic. In sake of
succinctness, only a limited number of cases whose central constitutional question directly relate
are discussed. These cases were specifically chosen because they question either whether or not
an informed warning should be required in certain circumstances or on what basis consent is
considered voluntary. Those cases are Miranda v. Arizona (1966), Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
(1973), Florida v. Bostick (1991), Ohio v. Robinette (1996), Dickerson v. U.S. (2000), and U.S.
v. Drayton (2002).
The creation of a required warning of constitutional rights by police began in 1966 through
Miranda v. Arizona. In four separate cases, defendants Ernesto Miranda, Michael Vignera, Carl
Calvin Westover, and Roy Allen Stewart, confessed to crimes without being warned of their
constitutional rights. In a landmark case, the Supreme Court voted 5-4 that confessions by
suspects in custodial interrogations are not admissible unless the officer reminds the suspects of
their constitutional rights and ensures that they understand them. Specifically, those rights are
their rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present. If the suspect chooses to invoke their
rights, questioning must stop. The Court mandated the issue of a warning, now commonly
known as the Miranda warning or Miranda rights, for officers to issue when conducting a
custodial interrogation.
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Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that during custodial
interrogations individuals are significantly deprived of certain freedoms, jeopardizing Fifth
Amendment protections. According to Warren, Fifth Amendment protections are so fundamental
that safeguards need to be enacted in order for people to fully understand the adversarial nature
of the encounter. That is, that the person they are speaking to does not necessarily have their best
interests in mind. The Court considered custodial interrogations to be inherently coercive.
Warren stated that the only way to assure that individuals know their rights and understand them
is through a warning and no amount of circumstantial evidence could similarly prove this
understanding. Protecting Fifth Amendment rights, according to the majority opinion, enhances
the integrity of the future court proceedings. However, four of the Justices on the Court did not
agree with the majority. Much of the dissenting opinions asserted that creation of this warning
cannot justly be read in the Constitution, and that the Court created a new law in this perceived
misreading of the Constitution. In Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion, he argued that these rules
enacted are not to protect people from brutality or coerced confessions, but instead to “negate all
pressures” and that “there can be little doubt that the Court’s new code would markedly decrease
the number of confessions” (Miranda v. Arizona, 1966, p. 505; Miranda v. Arizona, 1966, p.
516). Drawing on the significant role confessions play in solving some crimes, Harlan called this
decision a “hazardous experimentation” (Miranda v. Arizona, 1966, p. 517). Discussion of
Miranda’s exact impact in law enforcement and the truth behind Justice Harlan’s claims are later
discussed.
A similar debate came into question through Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973). Bustamonte
and five other passengers were pulled over. The officer then asked for consent to search the
vehicle, to which one of the passengers consented. Stolen checks were found in the car. The
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defense then argued that the checks should be inadmissible. The question then became on what
standard the prosecution needs to prove consent was voluntary – if proving that the defendant
knew of his right to refuse consent was necessary. The Court decided that the standard for
voluntary consent was reasonableness based on the totality of the circumstances and the
prosecution does not necessarily need to prove the defendant knew of their right to refuse
consent.
Like Miranda, the Court was similarly conflicted in their 6-3 decision in Schneckloth;
however, this time the majority ruled against creating a warning for consent searches. The Court
held that while knowledge of one’s rights is a factor to consider in assuring voluntariness, this
factor is not determinative by itself. Drawing on how vital the practice of consent searches is to
law enforcement – especially when officers lack probable cause for a search – Justice Stewart
stated in his opinion that creating a Miranda-type warning for consent searches would be
“thoroughly impractical” (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 1973, p. 231). He asserted that requiring
proof of a defendant’s knowledge of their right to refuse consent would impair prosecution of
cases where the state is unable to prove this knowledge but also finds no evidence of coercion.
Stewart also argued that although the Miranda court noted that custodial interrogations are
inherently coercive, there is no logical rationale to believe that consent searches share that
quality (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 1973).
Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, noted his disbelief that citizens could rightfully
waive a constitutional right lacking knowledge of their ability to do so. Justice Marshall agreed
with this consideration in his dissenting opinion, and furthered his discussion that the question of
this case was not whether or not actions taken by the police interfered with the defendant’s
voluntariness, but whether or not a lone question seeking search consent validates a search. He
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supported his discussion on that matter by arguing that consent means a “knowing choice,” and
that knowledge of any alternatives of a matter establishes a decision. Justice Stewart’s opinion
challenged these claims, stating that courts do not overlook whether or not one had knowledge of
their right to refuse consent; circumstantial evidence and factors such as low intelligence or other
indicative factors of one’s knowledge of their right refuse have traditionally been considered in
assessing the totality of the circumstances (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 1973). Taking into
consideration the perspective courts often by this standard, later discussion of empirical findings
will evaluate the effectiveness of this standard of voluntariness. Marshall contended that
assuming that proof of one’s knowledge of the right is required; this burden of proof should rest
on the prosecution’s shoulders, essentially through police providing a search consent warning.
Using the example of the FBI’s routine use of consent search warnings in the past, Marshall
dispelled Stewart’s claim that such warnings would be impractical. He further argued that the
argument of practicality is focused on the police benefitting from the ignorance of the public. It
is the nature of the Constitution to protect citizens’ rights and, thus, it eliminates some measure
of convenience for the police (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 1973). Further examination of this
debate over the practicality of effective warnings will employ research on Miranda’s
implications and examples of consent search warnings.
Decades later, the debate over voluntariness of consent reappeared in Florida v. Bostick
(1991). Officers conducting a routine bus sweep asked Bostick for consent to search his luggage
and actually did inform him of his right to refuse. After consenting, the officers found drugs in
his luggage. The question before the Court was whether or not the police could randomly ask bus
passengers for search consent, given a reasonable person feels free to leave. Again reaffirming
the reasonableness standard based on the totality of the circumstances, the Court decided that a
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reasonable person would have felt free to end the encounter – meaning the consent to search was
valid so long as, on remand, the Florida Supreme Court later found Bostick’s consent voluntary
based on this standard.
In the opinion of the Court, Justice O’Connor argued that the focus of the issue at hand was
not whether or not a reasonable person would have felt free to leave since, given they were
seated on a bus intending to depart, passengers would have no intention of leaving the bus if
police were not present. Instead, O’Connor argued that the correct focus was whether or not a
reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the encounter. The Court consequently
decided that the officers’ conduct gave no inclination that the passengers did not have a right to
not cooperate. The dissent all but agreed with the majority’s focus on whether or not a
reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the encounter, but argued that the better
question would have been whether they would have felt free to do so without a reminding of
their rights. The dissenters stated that a reasonable person would not feel free to terminate the
encounter if they were not advised of their rights, given the show of authority by the officers
through their positioning on the bus, and display of their guns and badges (Florida v. Bostick,
1991).
The Court again considered a similar question in Ohio v. Robinette (1996). Robinette was
pulled over for speeding, for which the officer had Robinette step out of the car to be issued a
verbal warning in front of the officer’s dash cam. After Robinette returned to the car and the
officer returned his paperwork, the officer then asked for consent to search the car. Robinette
consented, and drugs were found in the car. The issue at hand was primarily focused on how the
officer phrased his question, “One question before you get gone…..?” (Ohio v. Robinette, 1996,
p.35). On appeal, the Ohio District Court of Appeal and the Ohio Supreme Court both agreed
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that the evidence found in the car should be suppressed since the officer had not informed
Robinette that he was free to leave prior to seeking consent. The Ohio Supreme Court
subsequently required officers to issue a warning prior to asking for consent to search. The U.S.
Supreme Court overturned this decision by reaffirming their decision in Schneckloth that officers
do not need to inform citizens they are free to go before seeking search consent. Thus, the Court
again ruled that voluntariness of one’s statements were based on reasonableness and measured
by the totality of the circumstances. Again, the Court’s rationale was that it would be unrealistic
for officers to be required to issue a warning of one’s rights. Justice Stevens was alone is his
dissent by disagreeing that a reasonable person would have felt free to go given the
circumstances, and that an answer to the question was implicitly sought before the defendant was
free to leave. Stevens agreed with the Ohio courts that most people would assume they were not
free to leave until the officer was done asking questions. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, in their
dissenting and concurring opinions, respectfully, stated that the Constitution does not require
warning of Fourth Amendment rights but also does not prohibit them. If legislatures in states
were to adopt such policies, they would not be unconstitutional. Furthermore, they both stated
that if state courts determine their state constitutions to require such warnings it would not be
against the Robinette decision or the U.S. Constitution. However, the Ohio Supreme Court chose
not to keep the warning rule (Ohio v. Robinette, 1996).
In 2000, the Court’s previous decision in Miranda came into question again as they decided
whether or not to uphold that precedent in Dickerson v. U.S. The defendant, Dickerson, was
interrogated by FBI agents in relation to bank robbery and gave incriminating statements without
being read his Miranda rights. The government argued that his statements should still be
admissible in court since 18 U.S.C. Section 3501 – Congressional legislation passed shortly after
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Miranda – stated confessions are admissible so long as they were made voluntarily. The question
before the Court then was if Congress could supersede the Supreme Court’s decision through
legislation. Was the Miranda decision constitutional law or court-made law? The Court decided
that the Miranda decision was a constitutional right and that Congress could not overrule it
through legislation. Interestingly, the Court claimed that the previous totality of circumstances
standard was more problematic for law enforcement and courts in practice. The Court further
decided not to overturn the Miranda decision as it became deeply rooted in American culture and
the Court did not find compelling rationale to overturn the decision. As a result, Dickerson’s
statements were not admissible.
Finally, U.S. v. Drayton (2002) was a chance for the Court to examine similar circumstances
as Bostick. In this case, bus passengers Brown and Drayton were asked by officers conducting a
routine bus sweep for consent to search their persons. Brown consented, and drugs were found as
a result of the search. He was then taken into custody. Police asked for consent from Drayton,
and he raised his hands up, seemingly signaling consent. Again, drugs were found on Drayton
and he was taken into custody. The question that came before the Court was whether or not the
consent to search was valid (i.e. voluntary) if officers had not reminded the defendants they
could refuse to cooperate. The majority held that the Fourth Amendment does not require such a
reminder and, thus, the search was valid.
The majority anchored much of its decision on the Bostick framework. Applying the test of
whether or not a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter with the officer,
the Court noted that the police did not take any action that would have alluded to anything other
than a voluntary encounter. The mere presence of an officer or the fact that the officer likely has
a gun and a badge, as the majority argued, did not amount to coercion. Furthermore, the Court
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declared that just because Brown was arrested did not make Drayton or anyone else on the bus
seized. Justice Kennedy argued that, if anything, the fact that Brown was arrested should have
raised Drayton’s awareness of the consequences of police finding contraband on Drayton during
a consensual search. In the dissenting opinion, Justice Souter pointed to the fact that when the
officers boarded the bus, one stood in the back of the bus, one sat in the driver’s seat, and one
walked down the aisle to talk to the passengers. During this time, the bus driver was off the bus
with all of the passenger’s tickets. Given the totality of these circumstances and again applying
the reasonableness standard, Justice Souter argued that no reasonable person would have felt free
to terminate this encounter (U.S. v. Drayton, 2002).
Provided the arguments both for and against informed warnings, the Court has often debated
over three primary premises: whether or not warnings should be read into the Constitution,
whether or not certain situations or actions taken by the police are coercive (whether observably
or inherently), and, finally, whether or not warnings hinder the capability of the police. Since the
duty of interpreting the Constitution rests with the courts and the Supreme Court has historically
taken a stance against consent search warnings, this thesis will not explore the constitutionality
of a consent warning. Instead, sociological research is used to explore if a warning is impractical,
and if the police conduct or the situation itself is coercive.
The Debate over Voluntariness of Consent
The Supreme Court has made many claims and has held opposing views by different Justices
on how a reasonable person might have felt or how they would have reacted in certain situations
presented before the Court in varying cases. Indeed, this issue could be questioned logically; why
would a reasonable person, presumably knowing if a search is going to result in the unfolding of
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incriminating evidence, ever consent to a search? Drawing on what Supreme Court Justice
Frankfuter once said in Culombe v. Connecticut and Justice Stewart reinforced in the
Schneckloth opinion, observing a “but-for” cause of voluntariness is truly inadequate as the
majority of people would not give incriminating statements if it wasn’t for an official
government action (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 1973). Practically speaking, it is very unlikely
that somebody will walk into a police station and confess to a crime the police are not yet aware
of. More likely, on the other hand, is that a person confesses during a police interrogation. With
this in mind, this thesis does not consider voluntariness in this “utopian” sense, but rather,
observes different pressures that factor into the issue of voluntariness. As Justice Stewart wrote
in the Schneckloth decision, a voluntary decision will be considered “an essentially free and
unconstrained choice by its maker” (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 1973, p. 225). Numerous
experiments in social psychology and other empirical evidence present the argument that people
often feel like they must cooperate with the officer, indicating a constrained choice by the
decision maker.
Compliance with Authority
Compliance with authority is something that one learns at a young age. Young students listen
to their teachers, people obey doctors’ orders, and employees listen to their employers. In many
situations, compliance with authority is a logical sense to form decisions and take actions. In
other situations, however, compliance has become so common and impulsive that it no longer
makes sense. Perhaps you been driving and mindlessly following traffic laws out of habit instead
of deliberately thinking about every single action. That is because certain behaviors are often
scripted, and those scripts become influenced by social roles. Authority and subordinate social
roles create certain scripts that influence how people are supposed to act in certain situations.
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This explains why people do not always think about every action or decision they make and
often act without conscious choice. The reason people do this is that it can have positive effects
without necessitating complex cognitive processes, such as the example of mindlessly obeying
traffic laws while driving. However, it can also have negative consequences (Nadler, 2003).
To begin, compliance with authority might be best exemplified by Stanley Milgram’s famous
experiment. Subjects were told to ask a confederate a series of questions and deliver an
appearing real shock with increased intensity if the confederate incorrectly answered the
subsequent question. If the subject tried to refuse to deliver the shock, the researcher, dressed in
a white lab coat, kept encouraging the subject to continue. Most of the subjects continued all the
way to the highest intensity shock, but all of the subjects continued after the confederate was
seemingly being hurt by the shocks (“danger” was written on buttons in the higher-intensity
shocks) (Milgram, 1963). This study has notoriously shown that people often act against their
best interests and against their beliefs to comply with authority. While in this study, people
complied with an authority figure wearing a white lab coat, comparatively, in consent search
cases the authority figure is wearing a badge and a gun.
Another famous experiment observed if people would confess to something they knew they
did not do. Kassin and Kiechel (1996) set up an experiment which participants were asked to
type on a keyboard to supposedly measure reaction time, but not hit the “ALT” key (as that was
said to have ruined the test). After a preset amount of time, the computer was set to stop
working. The experimenter then accused the participant of pressing the ALT key. Participants
were previously split into groups based on slow- and fast-paced reaction time groups (i.e. how
fast the words were read during the typing portion). Once the experimenter accused the
participant of pressing the ALT key and supposedly ruining the experiment, a confederate in the
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room then either claimed they saw the participant press the key or didn’t see the participant press
the key. Of the seventy-five total participants, 69% signed a confession that they pressed the key
(indicating to the researchers that they complied with authority), 28% told a second confederate
outside the room that they had pressed the key (indicating to the researchers that they
internalized the false confession), and 9% later confabulated to the experimenter false facts about
how exactly they supposedly pressed the key. Subjects in the fast-paced group where the
confederate claimed they saw the participant press the key were most likely to confess,
internalize, and confabulate to pressing the key. Subjects in the slow-paced group where the
confederate did not claim they saw the participant press the key were least likely to do either of
these.
Through this experiment, Kassin and Kiechel (1996) showed that although none of the
participants pressed the ALT key, around two-thirds of them confessed to doing so and some
actually came to believe that they did so. A small portion of the participants even confabulated a
story in coherence with their false belief. Although the outcome to confessing in this experiment
was very low-risk, it does show that people sometimes will act against their presumed best
interests to comply with authority (in this case the research experimenters). Even though it does
not prove that any or all criminal confessions are coerced or involuntary, it does provide a reason
to question the voluntariness of such acts in the face of authority.
The Actor-Observer Bias
One phenomenon that could also affect decisions is the actor-observer bias. That is, when
explaining other people’s behavior, people are often inclined to overlook invisible situational
factors that could influence one’s behavior in lieu of more overt internal factors. For instance,
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one study showed recordings of confessions through the perspective of either the suspect or the
interrogator. Higher amounts of coercion were perceived when the subjects observed the
confession through the perspective of the suspect instead of the interrogator. In another
experiment, subjects were shown to be more likely to overestimate the amount of beeps they
heard in a laboratory setting if subjects before them also overestimated the amount of beeps they
heard. Furthermore, outside observers came to believe that they would not be as influenced as
the subjects were. Over several decades, one study asked subjects to write essays on content that
they disagreed with. Compliance, in that case, was extremely high. In another, subjects were
asked hypothetically if they would write an essay on something they disagreed with. In that case,
the majority of participants predicted they would not. Thus, these studies show Nadler’s point
that by changing perspectives people are often inclined to misjudge the amount of autonomy
people place in others’ decisions and even inaccurately predict how they would act in a given
situation. These findings represent disconnect between how observers perceive one’s actions as
voluntary and how the actor perceives those actions. People often overjudge one’s perception of
an “unconstrained” choice (Nadler, 2003).
Kagehiro (1988) highlights the fact that when judging the voluntariness of search consent,
courts take the perspective of the observer. Accordingly, Kagehiro tested the differences between
observer and consenter in a consent search by having subjects read and respond to different
vignettes describing police requesting search consent of a home through either the perspective of
observer or consenter. Additionally, Kagehiro tested if differences occur when the consent is
requested specifically (with more details) or nonspecifically (providing less or vague details),
and declaratively (as a statement) or interrogatively (as a question). This was accomplished by
changing how the consent is requested differently across the groups. The most notable results
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were that observers overestimated the consenters’ perceived choice to revoke consent and the
perceived permitted scope of the consented search. They also underestimated the likelihood that
consenters would request more information about the search. Finally, when the request was
phrased as a question instead of a statement, observers perceived the consenters as having more
of a choice to give consent, and consenters were more likely to ask additional information or
withhold consent. Thus, it can be inferred by the results of this experiment that courts are likely
to overestimate the perceived ability to revoke consent and the scope of the search, and
underestimate the likelihood that citizens would request more information about the search. This
raises the question of what the citizen thought they were consenting to compared to what the
search actually entailed.
It is important to note that the different methods of requesting consent in the previous study
were not perceived as coercive to the experiment participants. However, other aspects of
consent-seeking situations, like tone of voice, were not tested (Kagehiro, 1988). Although the
subjects in this experiment did not perceive the statements as coercive, the actor-observer bias
shows that the perception others view one’s voluntariness is often questionable.
Social Validation
In addition to the actor-observer bias and people’s general compliance with authority, social
validation often constrains the decision making process as well. People sometimes make
decisions in ambiguous situations by following others’ decisions. If other people have already
made a certain decision, or at least appeared to have, then one is more likely to make that
decision. Again, this is not an elaborate cognitive process but more likely an automatic response
to a situation. For instance, if you were walking down the street and just finished a can of pop
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you might be faced with the decision to throw the pop can on the ground or wait until you find a
recycling can. If it looks like other people have already littered, social validation theory argues
you would be more likely to litter as well. One does not necessarily need to observe others doing
an act, the perception of others doing it or even imagining others doing it is enough to influence
one to comply – even if that is not what they intended to do (Nadler, 2003).
Support for this theory stems from Solomon Asch’s well-known experiment on conformity.
Subjects were asked to observe lines drawn on a board and determine which lines were the same
lengths. When asked alone, subjects answered almost every one correctly. Asch gave the same
test to other subjects but had several confederates give the same false answer prior to the subject
giving their answer. In the vast majority of cases, the subject conformed to the group and gave an
answer they knew was wrong but corresponded with the rest of the group (Asch, 1955).
Additionally, research shows that people often falsely predict that they would not fall victim to
social influence if they were in the Asch experiment despite research showing that these
predictions underestimate the reality of social influence in research subjects’ responses to this
experiment. Again, this study shows a similar point as before: people’s decisions are affected by
those around them even though many people will doubt the influence others have on them
(Wolosin, Sherman, & Cann, 1975). This point again shows that the Court needs to realize that
people do not always act according to their best interests. In the instance of the Drayton case, the
police sought search consent from other passengers on the bus before confronting Brown and
Drayton. Those passengers gave their consent, and no other passengers on the bus made any
hesitation to comply with the officers. Social validation theory would lead one to believe that
Brown and Drayton would mindlessly feel compelled to comply with the officers in this scenario
because others have been observed to do so. The Court’s current standard for voluntariness does
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not employ empirical evidence showing social influence on one’s decisions. To truly establish
voluntariness in decision making, people must be more empowered to make a decision despite
social influence that could guide them into a potentially dangerous decision.
Other Factors Constricting Voluntariness
There are additional factors that influence compliance. Empirical evidence shows that
physical distance affects compliance, with less distance between people indicating higher rates of
compliance. Particularly, evidence shows that people prefer to keep more distance from highstatus people, like a police officer or authority figure. One interrogation tactic is to slowly move
closer to a person while questioning them to highlight this discomfort. Other situations where
people prefer to keep more distance during interactions include being backed into a corner, high
stress situations, or being in an environment with a low ceiling – all of these factors are
presumably present on routine “bus sweeps” such as the Drayton case. All of these factors are
shown to lead to higher rates of compliance (Nadler, 2003).
Time is another factor that has been shown to influence decision making and compliance.
This factor is relatable to almost anyone that has ever ordered food at a restaurant or had to make
other split-second decisions. When an officer seeks consent from a suspect the countdown begins
for the suspect’s response. If the suspect avoids answering the question or otherwise evades a
response they could likely be viewed as uncooperative. However, the pressure of time does not
permit adequate cognitive processes for decision making. Studies show that when pressured by
time, people prematurely end their decision making process before analyzing relevant
information which they may have considered not given a time constraint (Nadler, 2003).
Relatedly, police from a town in New Jersey once sent out consent forms to households with
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teenage children asking for permission to enter the house if police received a report of underage
drinking at that residence in an effort to curb underage drinking. Of the 2,700 consent forms sent,
twenty were signed and returned. Comparing this small percentage of consent actually granted
compared to the large percentage of consent granted for other searches implies that more time
allows for a better decision making process and, in this case, could result in less consent granted
(Hanley, 1994). It is important to note, however, that high rates of consent do not stand alone as
evidence of coercion and that, in this study, consent was sought for permission to enter one’s one
at an unspecified time – notably more invasive than a search of one’s person or car during a
specific instance. Despite this fact, this example does show the influence of time in decision
making. An informed consent warning would not likely eliminate any influence of time pressure
for an on-the-spot decision about whether or not to grant an officer permission to search;
however, it would likely slow down the pace of the encounter and relieve the citizen of some of
the stress related to the encounter. This would be accomplished through requiring the officer to
pause and deliver a scripted warning.
Discussion of the many factors and various studies about compliance and the very question of
voluntariness itself are not to suggest that police act unethically or that their behavior is in itself
coercive. Merely, as Nadler (2003) says, it’s to emphasize the fact that, “an atmosphere
interpreted as non-coercive or voluntary from the perspective of the police can at the same time
be experienced as coercive and non-voluntary from the perspective of a reasonable (innocent)
person who is the target of police suspicion” (p. 199). Many of these factors discussed are not the
result of police brutality, but these studies indicate a certain level of inherent compulsion that
constrains one’s ability to make a free decision. People are naturally inclined to comply with
authority. This is provoked through social validation, limited time to make decisions, or close
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distance during interactions. The actor-observer bias also shows that courts are likely to
underestimate the influence these factors have on decisions. These findings offer insight on one
of the Court’s basis for the consent warning argument. They do not suggest that a warning
should be created without looking into other implications of a warning.
The Debate over Practicality of a Warning
Drawing from Miranda’s Impact
Exploring the impact Miranda has had on police effectiveness can help to predict what effect
a consent search warning might have. Understandably, the Miranda decision was highly
controversial and met with profound criticism. Immediately following the decision, several
different studies sought to examine just what implications Miranda had on policing. A 1967
study by Yale Law School on the confession rate in New Haven, Connecticut found little impact
in the number of confessions obtained immediately following the Miranda decision. Studies in
Washington D.C., Los Angeles, and Pittsburg found similar results. A study conducted in Detroit
found that the amount of confessions actually increased after Miranda. Further studies in areas
such as Denver, Knoxville, Los Angeles, and other cities near the time of the Schneckloth
decision in the 1970’s found similar results. On the contrary, some writings in the 1980’s
suggested that these early Miranda evaluations understated its effect on law enforcement.
Overall, the consistency of those findings contradicted what the Miranda dissenters and the
Schneckloth majority claimed: warnings would be impractical and significantly harmful to police
effectiveness (as cited in Gallini, 2013).
Unfortunately, much of the research on the effectiveness of Miranda in policing happened in
the years soon following the decision, and empirical evaluations of the topic since then have
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essentially became fruitless (Gallini, 2013; Time & Payne, 2002). Some scholars argued that the
findings of these previous studies only examined short-term implications of the Miranda
decision and, thus, should not be current cornerstone arguments in the Miranda controversy
(Time & Payne, 2002; Thomas, 1996). Additionally, researchers have debated over the accuracy
of these findings as some factors have not been constant across the boards. Those factors include
counting all interrogations or only custodial interrogations, or counting total confession rate or
only among suspects interrogated. However, once these factors are accounted for in the data, the
studies overall do not reflect evidence of a Miranda effect (Thomas, 1996).
An additional study conducted while the Supreme Court was hearing Dickerson focused on
Virginia police chiefs’ opinions regarding Miranda and its implications on policing instead of
just examining interrogations and police effectiveness in solving crimes. By reevaluating
Miranda decades after the decision and at a time when the precedent was under question again
by the Court, this study was able to consider how those in position to influence police officers –
gatekeepers to the criminal justice system – perceived the effect Miranda had on their abilities to
do their job. Although the opinions were somewhat mixed, the majority of the chiefs surveyed
did not consider Miranda to significantly impair their ability to do their jobs and also supported
the Supreme Court to uphold the Miranda precedent when deciding Dickerson. This study did
not examine data related to crime rates or trends in confessions, but it showed that the majority
of chiefs in this state did not perceive Miranda as having long-lasting effects to significantly
impair their law enforcement duties (Time & Payne, 2002). In combination with the previous
studies, the evidence suggests that the Miranda decision has not had a long-term impact of
critically hindering police effectiveness.
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This is not to say that Miranda has not affected policing at all. Leo has written many times
about the nature of police interrogations and the related history of police professionalization.
Deception, he argues, has replaced coercion. Police once relied on using the “third degree,” or
physical coercion, to elicit confessions. However, through professionalization, changing public
attitudes, and changing legal doctrine, the focus shifted to psychological tricks during the earlyand mid-twentieth century. This use of deception and manipulation has been more effective and
fairer than physical violence, according to Leo (Leo, 1992; Leo, 1996). Miranda has had no
significant impact on police effectiveness in obtaining confessions and very few confessions are
inadmissible at trial due to a Miranda violation. This is partly because police have effectively
adapted to Miranda through ways of minimizing its significance, negotiating it, or avoiding it
(Leo, 2008). The irony of Miranda, Leo (1996) argues, is that police have remained effective in
interrogations but have also transformed their power in the interrogation room. Miranda has
influenced police to become more creative and efficient while symbolically showing that they
take civil rights seriously. All in all, it influenced police professionalization.
If we are able to learn anything from Miranda’s impact it is that warnings have not had any
significant impact on cooperating with the police. Although the initial fear of the Court’s
decision was that police would no longer be able to obtain confessions, there has been no
evidence that points to any significant change in the amount of confessions. Even with additional
rules, police are able to shift their tactics and remain effective. They’ve even used Miranda as a
symbol of their own professionalization.
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Consent Search Warning Examples and Available Data
Many have argued over whether or not a consent search warning would be impractical. Since
this is not constitutionally required as the Miranda warning is, the debate in this area is often
speculative. Despite the previous ruling in Schneckloth, there are some places in the country that
do require a consent search warning of various types. One example is the state of New Jersey,
which has some of the strictest standards for consent searches in the country. Officers there
cannot request search consent unless there is reasonable suspicion that contraband might be
found (State v. Yanovsky, 2001). Furthermore, for the prosecution to prove that consent was
voluntary, it must provide evidence that the defendant had the knowledge of the right to refuse
consent (State v. Johnson, 1975). As a result, the New Jersey State Police adopted a written
consent search waiver where citizens would read about their right to refuse, provided they fully
read the waiver. As an interesting note, State v. Johnson and Schneckloth were only separated by
a couple of years, and the section of the New Jersey State Constitution which the Supreme Court
of New Jersey based its decision is almost identical to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution (Thomas, 2009).
Another example of a currently enacted consent search warning rule is from St. Paul,
Minnesota, where the rule has existed since 2001. After citing racially-disproportionate amounts
of stops and searches, the St. Paul Police Department and the St. Paul Chapter of the NAACP
came to an agreement that included the creation of a consent search warning in order to bridge
race-relations (Estrada, 2001). The warning, which is required in all instances where the police
lack a warrant, probable cause, or legal exceptions to those instances and printed on the back of
officers’ Miranda warning cards, reads as follows:
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I would like to search you (or your vehicle)
You should know that you have the right to refuse to allow me to search you and your
vehicle
If you do grant me permission you may stop the search at any time
If I find anything illegal, you will likely be arrested and prosecuted
Do you understand what I have just told you?
May I search you? May I search your vehicle? (U.S. Department of Justice, 2001, p. 3)
Unfortunately, there have not been much publically available data on evaluations of this
policy, leaving little room to consider the successfulness of a search consent warning in the real
world. However, St. Paul is not alone is adopting warnings like this. A few North Carolina cities
have begun mandating that officers receive written consent forms from a suspect prior to a
consent search. In 2012, Fayetteville began this trend, followed by Durham in 2014, and
Carrboro and Chapel Hill in 2015 (Baumgartner, 2015). Around the same time in Texas, Austin
adopted a similar policy, and Dallas now requires its officers to obtain written or recorded
consent (Goldstein, 2013; Nicklas, 2012). All of the written warnings appear similar to St. Paul’s
in that they require officers to inform citizens of their right to refuse consent or withdraw it at
any time. Most of these cities also take it a step further and require supervisors to later review
each form or recording. These cities all cited racial bias in police stops and consent searches as
reasons that influenced these policies, as well as attempting to eliminate cases where defendants
later claimed they never gave consent (Goldstein, 2013; Nicklas, 2012; Baumgartner, Epp, &
Shoub, 2015a; Baumgartner, Epp, & Shoub, 2015b).
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Given how new these policies are, a plethora of data is not publically available for all of these
cities to evaluate the successfulness of their policies. Some of the cities have reported that they
will not be keeping record of some statistics, such as the amount of refused consent forms, so
potential future analyses might also be limited (Nicklas, 2012). Analyses of Fayetteville and
Durham’s policies have been published. In Fayetteville, there was a significant drop in the
amount of consent searches since written consent was required. This drop was not accompanied
by significant changes in the amount of other searches, like probable cause, but was
accompanied by a drop in the crime rate (Baumgartner et al., 2015b). In the second North
Carolina city to enact the policy, Durham, there was little change in the overall amount of
searches since the significant drop in consent searches was met by a larger increase in probable
cause searches. While in Fayetteville there was no indication of a “substitution effect,”
researchers suggest that in Durham consent searches were substituted by probable cause searches
(Baumgartner et al., 2015a).
These policies clearly have differing results, and these analyses are not determinative in the
effect that requiring written consent to search has on the overall search rate. Fayetteville’s policy
appears more successful since consent searches were not replaced by different types of searches.
In Durham, where researchers believe consent searches were replaced by probable cause
searches because of the policy, the question arises: Why didn’t police just use probable cause
searches to begin with if probable cause was evident? Some police administrators have indicated
that probable cause is not an “exact science” and is subjective. Thus, officers’ opinions of
probable cause could change as they may have to become less reliant on consent searches.
Although these two studies differ in their results and, clearly, more research is needed to be able
to draw any conclusions on the implications of search consent warnings, these studies in
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combination do show that requiring consent search warnings could result in changes in the rates
of other types of searches. These changes may or may not induce changes in the overall amount
of searches that police conduct.
Recalling that prior to the U.S. Supreme Court deciding Ohio v. Robinette, the Ohio Supreme
Court previously ruled that such a warning was required in Ohio through their decision in State
v. Robinette. Researchers took advantage of the roughly two years in which Ohio officers were
required to give the Robinette warning by examining the effects that verbal consent warnings had
on searches. A study during this era did not find any significant changes that resulted from the
Robinette warning in Ohio. However, the amount of times officers requested search consent did
slightly increase, although not significantly. Thus, this fluctuation could be random, but it does
challenge the Schneckloth Court’s intuitive claim that required warnings would dissuade officers
from using search consent as a reliable policing tool (Lichtenberg, 2004).
Another closely related study of the Ohio Highway Patrol during this time also found no
significant change in consent granted to search after issuing a warning. In this study, researchers
interviewed citizens that were targets of police consent searches in Ohio. In concurrence with the
findings, many subjects admitted that, despite the warning, they still felt like they “had to”
comply with the officer’s request to search (Lichtenberg, 1999). Overall, the available data
challenges the Supreme Court’s claims that warnings would critically impair the police. The data
suggests that warnings are not “thoroughly impractical.”
Some arguing for the creation of a consent warning have used this research as a cornerstone
argument, but that interpretation of the data does not reflect the entirety of the situation. As
subjects in the study in Ohio indicated, they still felt compelled to comply with the officers

28

THE CONSENT SEARCH WARNING ARGUMENT
despite the warning. It appears that warnings are not enough to overcome any inherent
coerciveness. Learning from Miranda, this might be because officers learn how to work some of
the previous factors discussed in their favor to induce cooperation. Other papers arguing over
consent warnings lack in combining the available data to fully understand a warning’s
effectiveness. For this reason, this thesis introduces a new area to the argument.
A New Approach: Procedural Justice
Other implications of an informed consent warning to search deal with perceptions of justice
and public opinion of police. As recently as 2011, data showed that more drivers subject to
searches thought the police behaved properly if they asked permission prior to the search
(Langton & Durose, 2013). Numerous studies have shown that legitimacy plays a crucial role in
compliance with the criminal justice system (Mazerolle, Antrobus, & Bennett, 2013; Tyler,
Fagan, & Geller, 2014). Public perception of police acting fairly is shown to influence higher
levels of trust and legitimacy in the police. Accordingly, Tyler’s process-based model of
legitimacy shows that using procedurally fair practices increases the public trust and legitimacy
in the police. Police legitimacy is often defined as trust in the police and perceived obligation to
obey the police. Citizens often are limited in their ability to judge actions by the police so their
judgments are often based on their amount of trust in the police. Thus, people see the police as
legitimate when they choose to obey the police because they trust the police (Nix, Wolfe, Rojek,
& Kaminski, 2015). Research related to Tyler’s process-based model and the concept of
procedural justice will show that an informed consent warning could increase public perceptions
of trust and legitimacy in police.
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Tyler’s model distinguishes between two types of justice: instrumental and normative.
Instrumental justice is the perception of favorable outcomes while normative justice is concerned
with a perception of a fair procedure that results in a fair outcome. Several studies by Tyler have
shown that people are often more concerned with the notion of normative justice than
instrumental justice. That is, people are more concerned with a perception of fair procedures and
fair outcomes than a favorable outcome. Tyler further broke-down types of normative justice as
procedural justice – concerned with the perceived fairness of procedures – and distributive
justice – concerned with the perceived fairness of outcomes. Data supports Tyler’s claim that
procedural justice is the strongest indicator of trust and legitimacy, although distributive justice
also plays a role (Engel, 2005; Nix et al., 2015). While some research indicates that race or
environmental factors are indicative of perceptions of trust and legitimacy in police, other studies
have also suggested that perceptions of fairness have the most influence in these areas (Engel,
2005; Nix et al., 2015). Further discussion of relevant studies will help to clarify the weighing
influence that different factors have in public approval of police.
Several studies by Tyler have indicated that citizens are more concerned with concepts of
normative justice than instrumental justice. One study conducted in Oakland did indicate that
citizens were concerned with both instrumental and normative justice, however. A different
study has shown that citizens’ evaluations of previous police encounters were the greatest
influences of attitudes on the police. To further evaluate Tyler’s model, Engel (2005) tested the
process-based model on traffic-stop data. Engel’s findings supported Tyler’s theory that citizens
were mostly concerned with normative justice but also found that they are interested in
instrumental justice as well. Interestingly, citizens who were searched or had their cars searched
were less likely to view the traffic-stop as legitimate. In combination with other studies by the
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same author, data supports that the majority of these searches were consent searches, which were
shown to be less successful in finding incriminating evidence. The authors then suggest that
police agencies should encourage officers to take efforts to explain their actions during trafficstops in addition to scrutinizing their standards on consent searches, in order to increase public
perceptions of police legitimacy (Engel, 2005). This could also be accomplished through a
consent search warning.
Another study by Nix et al. (2015) tested the influence that perceptions of neighborhood
evaluations of police had on individual perceptions of police legitimacy and trust to further
evaluate Tyler’s theory. They concluded that perceived collective efficacy is a significant
indicator for trust in the police; however, perception of procedural justice is a more important
determining factor. Furthermore, perceptions of procedural justice were confirmed to be more
important than neighborhood context, prior victimization, or even distributive justice. Thus, this
study did confirm Tyler’s process-based model in that perception of procedural justice is the
primary influence of trustworthiness of police, but it suggested that this influence does not
override other factors shown to influence trust in police such as perceptions of collective
efficacy.
According to empirical evidence supporting Tyler’s theory, the frequency of police-initiated
encounters or the intrusion of those encounters is less indicative of legitimacy than perceptions
of procedural justice during those encounters. However, as citizens are stopped by police more,
the levels of normative justice are likely to decline. Thus, the fact that somebody was stopped by
the police or the intrusion of that stop was less influential of the person’s evaluation of police
legitimacy than how fair they perceived the procedures during the stop (Tyler et al., 2014).
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In summation, Tyler’s process-based model has been supported by research to show that
when people perceive the procedures and outcomes of police encounters as fair, public trust and
sense of legitimacy in the police increases. The key components of procedural justice include
officers treating citizens with respect, giving them opportunities to share their views, and making
fair decisions. Although Tyler suggests that perceptions of procedural justice should trump other
factors in influencing public evaluations of police, research has indicated that other factors are
still relevant. However, procedural justice is the most determining factor (Engel, 2005; Nix et al.,
2015). When specific encounters are viewed as procedurally fair, that does not just influence that
encounter to be viewed as legitimate, but also has been shown to influence general views of
police and could have long-term effects on legitimacy (Mazerolle et al., 2013).
So what exactly does procedural justice have to do with consent searches? Gau (2012)
answered that question through analyzing data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics on traffic
stops. Recalling earlier discussion of the high volume of traffic stops annually, Gau saw these
incidents as a significant example of police-initiated contact. Gau found that requesting consent
significantly affected how motorists viewed the stop. When police requested consent, motorists
were found to believe that the police were less fair (meaning there was a procedural injustice),
and even viewed the reason for the stop as less legitimate. These findings show that consent
searches have a direct relation to procedural justice and police legitimacy.
The process-based model shows that a procedural safeguard like a consent warning could
have an impact on public opinion of the police. Because Tyler’s model focuses on the perceived
fairness and not the actual fairness of procedures, whether or not a warning would change the
fairness of the procedure in actuality is not the concern. Additionally, whether or not the
procedure ends in an actual search should not have as much effect on the perceived legitimacy as
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how fair the procedure is viewed, according to the model. Whatever impact a warning would
have on the rate of consent searches and whatever impact this would have in relation to the issue
of actual voluntariness in the situation notwithstanding, as citizens are uniformly afforded an
additional opportunity to invoke their rights it would be difficult to support an argument that
citizens would perceive the procedure as any less fair than without the warning. There is a
possibility that a warning would have no significant impact on the procedural justice, and
without the proper research indicating that it would increase the perceived fairness this
possibility cannot rightfully be ruled out indefinitely. However, this is not likely the case. It’s
more likely that a warning would increase the perception of fair procedures since one of the key
components of procedural fairness is police taking into consideration the interests of citizens and
giving them the opportunity to share their views. A consent search warning focuses on this
component.
As Gau’s study found, requesting consent significantly impaired the procedural justice and
perceived legitimacy of those traffic stops. To understand how to lessen this blow one must focus
on the manner in which consent is requested. A warning incorporates the key components of
procedural justice by offering the opportunity for a more fair decision and involving the citizen’s
point of view. Ensuring the citizen is knowledgeable of their rights via a warning symbolically
shows the officer is seeking to incorporate their point of view and best interests, similar to what
was seen with Miranda. It also shows that the decision by the citizen to withhold consent is a
right and that police requesting consent is not a decision by the officer to search that cannot be
challenged. Thus, it could rightfully mean that the citizen sees any consequential decision by the
officer with increased fairness.
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There are still limitations to this argument. How people respond to these changes could differ
by community and race. For instance, research has consistently shown since 1995 that whites
have significantly more confidence in the police than blacks, and in 2014, only 16% of blacks
anticipated police-public relations to improve in the next year (Drake, 2014; Pew Research
Center, 2014). Additionally, an investigation by the Department of Justice (2015) found
substantial racial bias and police misconduct by the Ferguson Police Department (which has
been at the forefront in the past few years for a police legitimacy crisis). The corresponding
report by the Department of Justice noted how the city’s emphasis on revenue collection instead
of public safety and racial bias in policing resulted in widespread distrust in the police. The
report suggested, among other things, that police in Ferguson stop consent searches for a little
while and increase citizens’ involvement in police decision making. In a community like
Ferguson, public trust in the police could be so broken that citizens might not respond
significantly to a consent search warning. As the report suggested, a community like Ferguson
would require several policy changes to increase police legitimacy. However, when citizens in a
community like Ferguson have so little trust in the police they are consequently further inclined
to resist police actions. Policies like a consent search warning could help increase citizen
cooperation by affording citizens an opportunity to take part in police decisions and actions.
The benefits of a consent search warning in the area of police legitimacy could also have
diminishing returns. For instance, the police in Newark, New Jersey, were recently found to have
prevalent unconstitutional practices (U.S. Department of Justice, 2014). Like Ferguson, Newark
is a community that could have large distrust in the police that would be difficult to mend.
Additionally, Newark would have to follow New Jersey’s consent search warning rule.
Therefore, the benefits to procedural justice could have diminishing returns over time and could
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also vary across communities and by race. More research is needed to fully understand the
relationship between procedural justice and a consent search warning, and New Jersey appears to
be the perfect place for such studies. Particularly, differences between communities like Newark
and Camden could provide answers to some questions. Camden has recently been found to have
increasing police-public relations after years of public mistrust (Zernike, 2014). Research
involving these communities and others in the state could show the differences across
communities and between racial groups.
Implementation of an effective warning has the shared benefit to citizens by likely increasing
the procedural justice of police encounters and to police through increased public opinion.
However, creation of a consent warning perhaps was not the original intention for Tyler’s model.
Merely, extending this model to the discussion of informed warnings should serve as an
application of procedural justice. Further studies are needed to better understand the relationship
between a warning and procedural justice. But, analogously comparing a consent warning to
Miranda, warnings have encouraged the police to become more creative and efficient. The
Miranda warning has influenced police professionalism while increasing fairness in the
interrogation room. A consent search warning could continue that trend and increase trust and
legitimacy in the police.
Conclusions
The Supreme Court has taken different stances related to warnings of Fourth and Fifth
Amendment rights. Standards related to both of these areas prior to 1966 were both rooted in
reasonableness viewed by assessing the totality of the circumstances. After Miranda v. Arizona,
the Court established a required warning during custodial interrogations that they chose not to
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overturn more recently in Dickerson v. U.S. In both of those cases, the Court decided that the
Miranda decision was constitutionally based. Conversely, the Court has rejected creating a
similar warning for consent searches, a stance the Court has reaffirmed time and time again since
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. In the examples discussed, the majority in each Supreme Court
decision determined that a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate each interaction
with the police through evaluating the totality of the circumstances. The Court also reiterated in
those cases that the Fourth Amendment does not require such a warning. Absent actions by the
police that amount to a degree of coerciveness, the Court has been unwilling to determine
consent in these cases discussed to be involuntary based on a perceived inherent coerciveness in
the nature of these situations. The Supreme Court has also historically held the view that required
warnings related to Fourth Amendment protections are impractical.
The consistency of these decisions suggests that the Supreme Court’s stance on consent
search warnings is not likely to change. The Fourth Amendment, as the Court argues, does not
require these warnings. It does not prohibit them either. As an alternative to trying to influence
Supreme Court Justices to change their historical stance on the issue, it is more practical that
police agencies, legislatures, or other agencies regulating police draw on their ability to make
significant change in adding protections of constitutional rights with the extra benefit of
increasing public opinion of the police. Furthermore, if police agencies take it upon themselves
to change their own policy they can take ownership of the consent search phenomenon without
the need for courts to take over.
Ignoring any arguments about the constitutional backing of these decisions, empirical
evidence can be applied to examine the rationale that Supreme Court Justices have based their
varied opinions over the years. In the argument over practicality of warnings, data surrounding
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the impact of the Miranda decision and data included in the different examples of consent search
warnings in practice around the country have not found any significant change in cooperation
with the police. These findings suggest that effective warnings are not impractical as some
Justices have argued.
In relation to the standard of reasonableness based on the totality of circumstances, social
psychological research has shown that compliance with authority, social validation, and factors
like limited time or physical distance often influence people’s decisions – many times not in the
direction of one’s best interests. Additionally, empirical evidence has found that when observing
decisions by others, observers are often inclined to overestimate the voluntariness the decisionmaker has. These findings challenge the nature of reasonableness and such claims that consent
searches are entirely voluntary in the absence of any inherent coercion. Especially given the role
courts take as an observer in situations of consent to search, research suggests that this
perception can often be skewed. While these findings challenge some claims made by Supreme
Court Justices in past decisions, they also do not indicate that a consent search warning would
eliminate the influence many of these factors have in the concept of voluntariness. In
combination with the data found on Miranda and consent search warnings in practice, the
research here indicates no significant change in the rate that people consent to searches is likely
even with a warning. Despite this, creation of a warning should not be intended to decrease any
amount of consent searches. Instead, the intent is to ensure more safeguards for constitutional
rights, empower the decision making process, and create a better informed public.
A consent search warning could have the benefit of increased trust in the police. According to
Tyler’s process-based model, when people feel like police treat them politely, consider their
opinions or best interests, and make fair decisions, public opinion of the police in general
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heightens. Public sense of legitimacy in the police increases when procedures and outcomes
related to police encounters are perceived as fair. A consent search warning is not likely perfect
in creating a utopian fairness. Instead, it is more likely to increase the perception of fair
procedures during police-public encounters. Application of Tyler’s model suggests that a consent
search warning would promote better public opinion of the police in general. In a time of news
headlines filled with cases of police shootings and other scandals, this issue should become
paramount in community relations with police. While a consent search warning is not the only
method of achieving this goal, given the historical racial disparities related to consent searches,
addressing this issue would be a significant step.
Consent searches would not likely create a perfect system, but just as the Constitution does
not necessitate a perfect trial, only a fair trial, this would not create a perfect system, only
promote a more fair system. Many of these factors observed in the social psychology of consent
voluntariness might not be overcome by such a warning. As we saw with the implications of
Miranda and other examples of consent search warnings, people’s willingness to comply with
officers did not significantly change as a result of these warnings. More likely, though, these
warnings have promoted a more fair system for police and public interactions. Just as the
Miranda majority argued that their decision in that case would enhance the integrity of the future
court proceedings on the matter, so too would consent search warnings. As Tyler’s model shows,
when people feel as though they are treated with dignity and respect by the police and that their
opinions and best wishes are considered, their confidence in the police increases. The police
have been dealt a great hand in their professional expertise in law enforcement. While consent
search warnings would not likely be giving the public a “better hand,” they would be easing the
police’s “poker face” and help establish a more fair game.
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